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Abstract This study explores the implications of control transfer and ownership structure on firm value and restructuring activities in Japan. We find that
conventional banks and business group affiliations negatively impact firm value
and organizational restructuring, but foreign and private individual shareholding have a positive impact on firm performance and its ability to restructure
internally. Furthermore, the transfer of ownership control to market-oriented
investors consistently results in greater firm value and restructuring activities
that enhance economic efficiency of listed companies in Japan.
Keywords Corporate governance · Organizational restructuring · Keiretsu ·
Business groups · Japan .

1 Introduction
Corporate governance is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that explains the
objectivity of the corporate world. It is considered as a framework that can control and monitor firm management to achieve efficient business operations and
organizational restructuring. This supports the agency view of financial theory
regarding conflict of interest between principal and agents as a governance mechanism. The stakeholder view, on the other hand holds that the corporation is a
coalition of stakeholders, by which internal and external stakeholders, like shareholders, managers, financial institutions, non-financial institutions and foreign
investors achieve their various interests. Such a corporate governance structure
is very complex due to conflicting objectives of stakeholders.
There are two established corporate governance regimes that are practiced
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in the business world: the Anglo-American system and the bank-based corporate governance system. The Anglo-American governance system is based on the
principles of competitive equity markets and shareholder wealth maximization.
The bank-based corporate governance system is practiced in Germany, Japan,
and South Korea where companies depend heavily on bank financing and are
well connected with business group affiliations to maximize the value for all
stakeholders.
Jensen (1986) argues that third party control improves resource allocation
and financial efficiency in poorly performing firms under the market-oriented
corporate governance system. Historically, main banks and business affiliated
groups (Keiretsu) have played a dominating role in Japanese listed companies
because of their majority shareholdings and long-term business ties. Generally,
such investors are known as stable investors and they try to establish long
term business ties with firms rather than focus exclusively on the achievement
of short-term objectives. These shareholders prefer commercial trade ties and
cross-holdings facilitate them to strengthen their corporate aims and relationship with client firms Prowse (1992) Inoue (1999). Furthermore, these shareholdings protect listed companies from financial distress, threats of takeover as
well as exposure to external capital markets. In return, stable investors exploit
all possible opportunities to accomplish long term growth objectives.
Market-based investors, on the other hand have short-term objectives such
as returns maximization, capital gain and rise in cash flows from the business. In
the Japanese financial system, the presence of such market based shareholders
has gradually increased in the form of equity investment by private domestic
investors, inside investors (management and employees) and foreign corporations. According to the empirical findings of Okabe (2004) foreign institutional
investors and domestic private shareholders have special financial incentive to
monitor the management and emphasize corporate profitability.
The regulatory framework and enactment of new corporate laws have ensured the protection of minority shareholders in pursuit of the market-oriented
corporate governance system. Hence, the growing importance of market-oriented
investors has converged the corporate governance system in favor of foreign and
domestic private shareholders. The clash of interest among various ownership
entities has increased spin-overs and corporate restructurings. The corporate
control market is hence, under great pressure because of consistent changes in
the regulatory framework, diversified investment strategies and policies implemented by corporate management.
Traditionally, the corporate governance system is based on maximization
of group interest and is dominated by inter-corporate groupings and business
alliances. The corporate reforms in 2006, particularly the three arrow policies
under Abenomics in 2013, have drastically changed the direction of the enterprise system due to significant change in the equity and corporate control
market. Resultantly, these corporate reforms have directed the attention of the
regulator to ensure the following objectives: (i) participation of independent outside directors in the corporate decision making process, (ii) diverting attention
from stakeholder value maximization towards shareholder wealth maximization,
(iii) augmenting competition in capital and control markets (i.e., takeovers and
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M&As), (iv) safeguard the rights of minority shareholders and (v) transparency
and information disclosure in accounting, financial, and other reporting to investors.
These corporate reforms in the objectivity of ownership are well described
in the recent empirical evidence from the Japanese financial and corporate control market. The rapid change in fiscal and employment policies and renewal
of incentive schemes by corporate management have resulted in the emergence
of new stakeholders and various ownership identities. A persistent decline in
shareholding by stable investors has weakened ultimate control and corporate
control of market-based investors is gradually rising.
Inoue (1999) has suggested that the relationship between institutional investors and listed companies has become more transactional as compared to long
term relationships in the past three decades. The development of the equity and
bond market together with financial liberalization has reduced the dependence
of listed companies on main bank financing and cross and block holdings Prowse
(1992). During the transition period, the internal management of Japanese firms
had been continuously engaged in the pursuit of their own vested interests on
behalf of shareholders’ value maximization objectives. Agency problems and
conflict of interest among various stakeholders have significantly enhanced the
economic inefficiencies in Japanese stock markets. The formal acknowledgment
of shareholder value maximization as the key objective of listed firms instead
of wealth maximization of all stakeholders has increased the importance of the
corporate control market. New company laws, financial and legal frameworks
are now being put in place to divert the focus of the management towards the
protection of shareholder rights.
It is expected that the introduction of transparency and disclosure of information laws and involvement of independent directors in the firm’s internal
decision-making process will reduce the agency cost and economic inefficiency
in Japanese corporations. A steady decline in the dominance of stable shareholders has increased the level of competition in the corporate control market
and market-oriented investors are significantly replacing their position in the
equity market especially since the early 1990s.
The dissolution of cross-holdings and decay in the dominance of the banking
system has played a decisive role in the improvement of firm performance and
restructuring activities. The equity market pressure and the competition in the
corporate control market has enhanced the restructuring of business organization and change in ownership structure has contributed to improvise resource
allocation and efficiency of firms. These characteristics and features of the corporate control market suggest that ownership composition and corporate governance have been progressing in the Japanese corporate market. In this study,
our main aim is to evaluate the empirical reasoning behind the recent corporate
makeup and the corporate governance mechanisms in the Japanese stock markets.
To pursue these objectives, we focus on two perspectives of the corporate
system. One is firm performance and the other is the connection between firm
performance and restructuring activities. So, we define the following three research questions:
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(1) To what extent does the ownership structure have an influence on firm performance and managerial control?
(2) How does change in corporate control influence firm value and restructuring
activities?
(3) Are the ownership identities responsible for poor performance leading firms
towards business organizational restructuring?
In this perspective, we try to empirically determine the ramifications of control transfers and ownership structure, stimulated by the modifications in the
monetary system, liberalization, and the regulatory policies during the 1990s
and early 2000s. A univariate and multivariate analysis has been performed to
test the hypothesis of the sensitivities of ownership structure and corporate control on firm value and organizational restructuring and to gauge the influence
of ultimate ownership on the performance of listed companies in the Japanese
stock market. Hence, a detailed comparative analysis of various ownership identities like financial, non-financial and private individual investors is carried out
to gauge their relative influence on firm value and restructuring activities.
This paper focuses on corporate governance and aims to (1) examine the
effects of ownership structure and regulatory changes in governance structure
on firm performance and organizational restructuring in Japan, (2) discover the
effects of corporate reforms in governance structure on the relationship between
firm performance and restructuring, (3) to explain how the reforms and regulatory changes have influenced firm performance and the process of restructuring
in Japanese stock markets.
The main contribution of the research study lies in insights delivered by
including a set of untouched variables assessing firms’ efficiency and tendency
towards restructuring activities. This study will also provide policy guidelines
for other countries where the change in ownership and control transfer to various corporate entities has occurred and companies are involved in transactional
commercial links within group business ties. This paper is important because
it includes the restructuring activities and corporate control transfer to various
ownership entities to assess the behaviour of investors during the reforms process in Japan.
In the following section, a detailed review of literature on corporate reforms
and firm’s behavior towards restructuring has been presented with respect to
the Japanese corporate governance system. Section three and four deal with the
econometric model and identify the methodological issues related to estimation
methods used to carry out the multivariate analysis. The univariate and multivariate estimation results are presented in the fifth section. Lastly, section six
presents the summary and concluding remarks.

2 Literature review
A study of the history of Japanese corporate ownership is important. It reveals that up to two-thirds of listed Japanese firms’ shares are held by other
firms Hodder and Tschoegl (1993). Some corporate block holders, called stable
shareholders, almost never sell out and consistently support the management.
36
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A group of companies linked by stable intercorporate shareholdings is called a
keiretsu. A keiretsu in which a bank plays a central role is called a bank group
or financial keiretsu.
The wave of divestiture and corporate restructuring spread globally during
the 1990s Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005a). Japan and many emerging Asian
countries, such as China, Thailand, and Hong Kong have ended the 20th century
with unadorned economic and social debates on reforms agenda and corporate
restructuring Andrews and Chompusri (2001). According to Filatotchev et al
(2000) and Makhija and Patton (2004), corporations of transition economies
have also pursued corporate restructuring due to poor performance especially
in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Czech Republic. A wave of significant restructuring activities has started even in large economies like the U.S and E.U; layoffs
and divestitures of businesses are visibly mentioned in corporate governance literature since the 1990s Bühner et al (1997) Cascio and Wynn (2004).
Corporate reforms under Abenomics have prompted many ways of restructuring activities including antitrust policy Harris et al (2004) Lazonick and
O’sullivan (2000) Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) and taxation Hoskisson and
Hitt (1990) and integration process based on the Western corporate governance
style. For instance, both forms of keiretsu, horizontal and vertical act as a governance mechanism in different sectors of the economy in Japan and its effect
on firm’s restructuring has not been discovered completely Kim et al (2004).
Recently, foreign institutional and domestic private investors are attaining
prominence in equity markets due to increasing proportion of their ownership
ratio in Japanese stock markets David et al (2006), but studies probing their
effects on corporate restructuring are yet very limited Ahmadjian and Robbins
(2005b), Ahmadjian and Song (2004). Corporate restructuring activities do not
occur frequently in emerging economies where firms are directly managed by
family managers who hold significant proportion of company shares La Porta
and Lopez-de Silanes (1999).

2.1 Corporate governance and restructuring
The most prominent foundation of diversified corporate restructuring is based
on the principal-agent model. Various governance factors that influence the
transformation of firms are explained by the agency theory Shleifer and Vishny
(1991). For instance Hoskisson et al (1994) confirmed the role of ownership
structure elements while Berglöf and Perotti (1994), Jensen (1986) and Murphy
et al (1991) realistically anticipated that the fear of buy out and takeover prepares the ground for corporate structuring in the U.S. firms.
However Kim et al (2004) claimed that business networking relationship reduces the possibility of organizational change in listed companies in Japan. The
above-mentioned studies argue that various elements of corporate reforms either facilitate or hinder restructuring activities. In sum, regulatory bodies have
initiated the process of organizational change in Japanese listed companies by
directly mandating the keiretsu to improve capital efficiency or through internal
and external control on management.
Business Review: (2017) 12(2):33-64
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In this research paper, we focus on three vital governance factors which
have been consistently ignored in corporate research but are recently gaining
much attention in Japan. These are foreign ownership Ahmadjian and Song
(2004), business group affiliation and inside institutional investors Filatotchev
et al (2000).

2.2 Group affiliation of business (Keiretsu)
The Keiretsu is defined as a collective formation of sovereign businesses under
joint financial and administrative control of a single person or family. These
highly integrated business groups are the established norm in the Japanese
business community since the nineteenth century. These vertical and horizontal
business networks govern non-publicly owned industrial corporations especially
in Japan Khanna and Palepu (2000). According to Wright et al (2005) vertical
and horizontal business affiliation might provide mutual benefit to group members through a web of interlocking relationships that can substitute inefficient
external markets. The business networks also function as a governance mechanism through their influence on the management of member companies and
might prompt the business to start a process of organizational change Hoskisson
and Turk (1990), Megginson et al (1994).
However, previous literature regarding restructuring activities argued that
business networks are adversely associated with firm’s ability to initiate restructuring programs for multiple reasons. First, these business networks may be less
receptive to absorb pressure due to inflexibility. The inflexibility and inelastic
behavior of member firms reveal that businesses have strong relational links
due to mutual debt guarantees, cross-holdings and inside trade Hoskisson and
Hitt (1990). Secondly, group reputation, common markets, product transmission channels, internal finance and access to an invisible capital market, can
rescue member firms from financial distress. Hence these keiretsu firms might
be less sensitive to changes in the competitiveness of the market and regulatory framework. Finally, keiretsu partners quickly rescue a member firm from
bankruptcy when it encounters problems of debt accumulation from the main
bank Lincoln and Gerlach (2004).
As a result, corporate reforms and economic policies were designed to dismantle business networks and weaken ties among business groups. Japanese
policies makers believed that the Keiretsus were the primary reason of the financial crisis in 1997. New commercial codes and corporate laws were formulated
after 2006 to pressurize Keiretsus to dissolve group level ties, cross-shareholding
and cross debt guarantees were completely discouraged under the new corporate
reforms.
Recent government under Abenomics has also reacted strongly against joint
moves that facilitate business group formation, setting transfer prices, inside
trade and mutual capital support especially in vertical Keiretus. The revitalization strategies required 80 dominated Keiretus to eradicate mutual debt guarantees and joint business moves by the end of 2015. Furthermore, corporate
reforms relating to business networks made it quite difficult to realize the ben38
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efits of being a member of keiretsu that hindered the restructuring of poorly
performing firms.

2.3 Main bank system and corporate restructuring
A detailed examination of the historical evidence of Japanese listed companys’ ownership describes that Keiretus have taken total managerial control,
particularly in horizontal keiretsus. Under the main bank system, a banker is
appointed to the firm’s board following poor performance for investigating the
causes of cash flow problems rather than lagging share price. However, within
bank groups, appointment of bank based directors could influence the company’s internal organizational structure to reduce over employment, but cash
flow considerations are very central to dependent companies.
Banker appointment in the board may improve the liquidity position of firms
to a certain extent but their role in employment decision making is highly suspicious. Bank monitoring is justified to achieve stability in share price but its role
in downsizing, rightsizing and cutbacks of perks may cause disloyalty of staff
and lower management. Bank based directors can strongly influence the administration of firms though financial incentives Abrahamson and Park (1994).
In the case of Japan, appointment of outside directors has increased the dissatisfaction of shareholders, and dissatisfied investors generally have three tactics to influence the company administration namely voicing opinion, exit, and
fidelity Hirschman (1954). Financial institution shareholders, often convey their
message to the administration through investor activism. Media campaigns,
proxy voting, along with private negotiation with firm management are common ways to establish their presence in the control market Ryan and Schneider
(2002). News of substantial selling of shares by major financial institutions can
put downward pressure on the firm’s share value which can trigger resale of
shares causing financial distress. Persistent fall in share value would then force
the firm to initiate organizational restructuring. Gillan and Starks (2003), Parrino et al (2003) and Kang and Shivdasani (1997), suggest that the likelihood
of restructuring of companies is greater if equity ownership of the firm’s main
bank is high.

2.4 Foreign ownership and corporate restructuring
Since early 1990s, the increasing prominence of international institutional shareholders has directed the corporate sector in Japan towards the Anglo-American
corporate governance system. Japanese stock markets were opened for foreign
investors with certain restrictions to foster the process of transition from stakeholder to shareholder value maximization. Consequently, portfolio investment
by western investors in the Japan Stock Exchange increased from 7.56% of the
overall investment in 1995 to 30% in 2016 (TSE, 2016).
Recent research argues that foreign institutional investors play a decisive
role in disseminating concentrated investment to internal shareholders and in
Business Review: (2017) 12(2):33-64
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supporting the restructuring activities such as rationalizing the resource allocation and employment oriented moves. Foreign institutional investors have a
greater impact on share market value than internal shareholders. Under these
conditions, risk of exit is an effective way of influencing the management of a
Japanese corporation Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005b).
Both local institutional and international stockholders actively provoke the
administration to capitalize shareholder benefits by initiating the restructuring
process Gillan and Starks (2003). If they find management reluctant to start
organizational restructuring they might deploy the threat of aggressive buyouts
or support the appointment of outside directors.
In the early 1990s, the financial crisis of Japanese stock markets was one of
the events which cautioned sleeping shareholders Johnson et al (2000), La Porta
et al (2000), Baek et al (2004). During this time, both domestic and foreign investors realized that their investment is not well protected by the Ministry of
Finance (MoF). These considerations initiated substantial withdrawal of portfolio investment and accelerated stakeholder involvement in Japan Baek et al
(2004) Rajan and Zingales (1998).
First, we explore the governance factors that have been relatively less studied
in previous literature but are gaining more attention in Japan recently; business
group affiliation Hoskisson et al (2005), domestic institutional ownership Filatotchev et al (2000) and foreign ownership Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005a).
Second, we empirically examine the effect of poor performance of firms on corporate restructuring using a balanced panel data set that consists of Japanese
firms data from 1991 till 2015. The change in investment pattern may have significantly influenced corporate restructuring of firms in the Tokyo stock market.
Our study can empirically test their effects on corporate restructuring.

2.5 Corporate restructuring and lifelong employment
Corporate restructuring is a multi-dimensional process of reshaping diverse aspects of a company in a competitive environment. In the dynamic business environment, it is vital for companies to improve their efficiency and profitability
which often requires rebuilding existing organizational systems and structure.
Various factors motivate the reorganizing of the company’s internal and external
setup such as improving market position, survival in adverse economic conditions and diversion towards new business direction. The role of management
and ownership is very significant before initiating the process of restructuring
as sometimes delayed decision of the management might lead to waste of resources and hurt the achievement of long-term objectives.
Generally corporate acquisitions, takeovers, bankruptcy moves, and buyouts can force the firm towards the restructuring process. During the process of
corporate restructuring multiple measures are under consideration by the administration like change in capital expenditure, change in fixed assets and switch
to capital intensive or labor intensive productive techniques. The principal-agent
model of corporate governance provides the basis for the overall restructuring
and improvement of business performance.
40
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According to the free cash flow theory, the top management invests free
cash flow in financially feasible projects having positive net flow. These projects
cause over-diversification and organizational inefficiencies Jensen (1986). As free
cash flow rises agency costs associated with misappropriation of business also
increase and managerial diseconomies of scale force the management to restructure the corporation due to threat of hostile takeover or divestitures.
In the literature on corporate governance three types of corporate restructuring have been identified first, portfolio restructuring involving divestment
and acquisitions; second, financial restructuring including stock repurchases,
recapitalization and changes in capital structure; third, operational restructuring including reorganization, changes in business strategies and retrenchment.
All three classifications of restructuring are interdependent and not mutually
exclusive. This research article primarily focuses on firm-level organizational restructuring due to changes in investment pattern and ownership structure. For
instance, according to Mitchell and Lehn (1990) Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and
Jensen (1986) organizational restructuring is very critical because of its significance for firm’s growth orientation and performance.
Symbolically lifetime employment epitomizes Japan’s distinctive form of
stakeholder capitalism. But lifelong employment does not prevail as the dominant form of employment in Japan. Lifelong employment is not an institution,
nor does it constitute a benevolent, kinder method of capitalism associated with
the market-based model. A combination of security of employment and flexibility of working practices termed as flexicurity is a common feature of law and
practice in Japan.
Is lifelong employment a dying institution in the new corporate governance
system? This has become a popular research question among political scientists
and economists Dore (2000). The deinstitutionalization of lifelong employment
will ensure the end of stakeholder capitalism and confirm the victory of the
Anglo-American corporate governance system Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001).
Some researchers do not agree with the victory of shareholder-oriented corporate governance practices because recent development in employment practices,
such as casualization of the labor force and increasing unemployment do not
support the argument of convergence to a market-based corporate governance
system.
Since 2006, corporate governance and neo-institutional theories are unable
to explain the rapid developments in the labor market and industrial relations in
Japan. We need comprehensive research for better understanding of the dynamic
change in Japanese legal and economic institutions. We also need new empirical
pieces of evidence that can explain the heterogeneous, transient and economic
dimensions of corporate governance. However, we try to investigate that is lifelong employment an economic compromise between labor and management in
the post-bubble period. This research article argues that a transformation is
taking place based on the intensification of existing measures of flexicurity.
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3 Theoretical framework
The convergence of traditional group-oriented governance system to the marketbased system and rising role of short-term investors has lasting impact on the
investment policy, financial performance and organizational structure. In this
section, we build the theoretical and empirical foundations of our research paper.
The study describes that ownership structure is contingent on firm performance and organizational structure. The distinctive goals and asymmetrical information by various class of stakeholders implies that conflict of interest could
adversely affect the firm’s long-term performance and organizational structure.
This section describes the rationale behind the interlocking relationship between firm’s performance and corporate restructuring and identifies the linkage
between corporate ownership structure and firm’s value hypothesis of the study.

3.1 Corporate restructuring regulatory change and ownership structure
After the revisions of the commercial code of capital markets in the late 1990s
and the early 2000s the process of restructuring was initiated but the composition of ownership is very complex in the diversified majority of listed companies
in Japan. Various changes in the law regarding holding companies, stock resale,
and repurchases and simplified mergers and acquisition have been effectively
introduced by regulatory bodies which have had a significant influence on investment decisions of national and international investors.
The return on investment and profitability ratios are primary indicators of
the firm’s ability to pay back the shareholders on their investment. The connection between ownership structure and restructuring depends upon the firm’s
performance that ultimately directs the principals to guide their agents to go
for restructuring. Wu et al. (2009) and Wu and Yao (2012) empirically display
the systematic relationship between corporate restructuring and financial performance over time. However, the Japanese corporate culture which is based on
the concept of community and group-oriented ownership has displayed strong
resistance against the government’s effort to initiate western style restructuring
to enhance economic efficiency.
Moreover, reorganization reform law of 2003 has replaced the old one and
new modifications have improved the transparency of business proceedings, information disclosure, collateral of secured rights, mitigation of the majority
requirement, fixing of claims, and payment methods etc. These changes have a
strong impact on investment strategies of shareholders due to improvement in
performance and transparency.
Prior to the enactment of the new law, Japanese companies had to endure
federal court inspection before conducting internal restructuring. They were required to obtain individual endorsement from the lenders for the transfer of
liabilities and assets that hindered the process of successful corporate restructuring. Now companies can easily choose their optimal corporate structure after
the introduction of reorganization reforms law. The implementation of efficient
42
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organizational structure depends on market conditions and long-term objectives of corporates. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the
concentrated ownership and organizational restructuring.
3.2 Ultimate ownership, control transfer, and corporate performance
The change in decisive ownership and regulatory framework can have positive
and negative impact on companies’ growth and financial performance. Block
holders have greater incentives and opportunities to control business administration as compared to minority shareholders. They can reduce the scale of the
agency problem and improve cash flows for all stakeholders by monitoring the
behavior of the management Shleifer and Vishny (1991). This would simultaneously maximize profit and decrease value.
Generally, group-oriented capitalists invest in undervalued companies and
assert administrative control that would facilitate the pursuit of better performance. Market-based investors are more interested in capital gain due to rise
in the current value of shares rather than long term growth of the firm and
other commercial ties from the change in ownership. Recently, many studies
have analyzed the impact of ownership on firm’s value and restructuring activities, Petkova (2008) for India, Girma et al. (2006) for the USA and Conyon et
al. (2002) have found a positive impact of ownership.
The empirical evidence of McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) suggests that frequent change in ownership has a negative effect on firm’s performance and share
market value. But in the case of permanent shareholders takeover, non-financial
and financial organizations can stimulate their own benefits at the cost of other
shareholders. Moreover, when firms are governed by stable shareholders prior
to the change in ownership, the objective of loaning and trade relations remains
dominant over economic efficiency.
The above-mentioned studies suggest that change in ultimate ownership has
a positive impact on firms’ operating and financial performance. We also expect the same directional change in firm value and organizational structure in
the Japanese market. It is more likely that the ownership change is positively
associated with performance. Therefore, we build the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis (1): Changes in ownership and corporate control are followed by
organizational restructuring and improvement in firm value.
3.3 Ownership concentration, organizational restructuring and firm’s value
According to existing literature, it an established fact that ownership concentration has a positive impact on the firm value and restructuring activities. Usually,
concentrated ownership has been assumed to deliver better monitoring incentives and, henceforth, boosts the performance of firms. Diversified ownership
creates the problem of a hold-up whereby the owners cannot refrain the managers from constructing their own empires at the expense of the shareholders.
The managerial entrenchment problem is also empirically supported by (Fama
and Jensen 1983) under which top management can commence value-destroying
Business Review: (2017) 12(2):33-64
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activities with low risk of sanctions or takeovers.
Hence, we conjecture a unidirectional relationship between ownership concentration and firm’s value and restructuring ability. Therefore, we construct
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis (2): There is a positive relationship between firm’s value and ownership concentration followed by organizational restructuring.

3.4 Firm value, ownership structure, and organizational restructuring
The composition of shareholdings in a company determines its ownership structure. How much equity capital is owned by an investor is quite important in explaining the ownership structure of firms in the Japanese stock market. Recent
studies have revealed that private individuals and foreign institutional investors
are out, waging the dominance of financial institutions and non-financial business shareholders but insiders are yet relevant in the governance of corporations
as owners in Japan.
The shareholders’ investment choices depend upon available opportunities
and their interests and priorities. Conflict of interest among different classes
of shareholders is natural because each has their own interest and objective in
listed companies. Hence, there is an implicit trade-off between maximization of
shareholder wealth and their strategic aims for each class of investors.
In the Japanese corporate control market most accepted identities are inside ownership, financial institutions, non-financial businesses, foreign, family,
and government-owned companies. These defined ownership identities have their
own distinctive strategic aims regarding firm performance and restructuring process. The shareholdings by financial and non-financial institutions have negative
effects on firm performance and restructuring activities due to the dominance of
main banks in corporate boards. Furthermore, financing patterns are strongly
influenced by Keiretu networks.
Cross-shareholding and cross-debt guaranties have a substantial impact on
decision-making regarding the firm’s objectives due to the tradeoff between longterm benefits and short-term value maximization of the firm. Hence, we infer
that there is a negative impact of financial institutions, cross-holding among the
corporations and control transfer to various ownership identities on firm value
and restructuring activities. The effect of market-oriented investors like foreign
and private domestic shareholders on firm’s value is predicted to be positive
due to their pursuance of strategic and corporate objectives of optimizing share
value in the short term.
Past literature regarding the role of multi-national corporations has confirmed the positive effects of organizational restructuring on firm’s performance.
This implies that foreign shareholders have strong abilities to monitor management and support performance-based incentives for managers. Moreover, the
new ownership structure allows the implementation of the kaizen management
style which enables consistent improvement in management practices and the
productivity of labor.
Our decomposition of overall ownership into six classifications with respect
44
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to their strategic objectives in the short run and long run depends upon the
financial performance and value maximizing behavior of the management. In
the late 2000s, stable rates of profit and more than expected high returns have
increased shares prices especially for market-oriented shareholders like domestic
private individuals and foreign institutional investors.
Government ownership is not motivated by the profit objective but focuses
on playing its strategic role in promoting competition. Blockholders, insiders,
and financial institutions also have their own distinct strategic aims and exclusive ownership structure in Japanese firms. Hence, we have developed two
hypotheses to explain the predicted relationship between ownership structure
and firm’s value.
Hypothesis (3A): There is an inverse relationship between ownership control
transfer to stable shareholders and firm’s ability to engage in restructuring activities.
Hypothesis (3B): There is a direct relationship between control transfer to
market-oriented shareholders and firm’s profitability and organizational restructuring activities.
A change in capital expenditures and tangible assets are considered as the
annual growth of capital expenditures and growth of the book value of fixed
assets year by year respectively. The change in fixed assets and capital expenditure are used to evaluate the influence of a change in ultimate owner’s assets
divestitures. The growth rate of an employee is designed as the growth rate
of employment in every firm at the close of the business financial year. These
constructed variables serve as the proxy for employee layoffs.

3.5 Change in firm ownership structure
The Japanese ownership structure has been robustly examined by several research studies in the last five decades. There has been a remarkable growth in
foreign investment with arms-length increase in institutional and domestic investment. According to Aoki (1990) and Colpan et al (2007), the variations in
shareholding are directly linked with continuous corporate reforms to achieve
the objective of shareholders value maximization and to protect the rights of
minority shareholders.
In the last three decades, even strong companies were unable to isolate themselves from business networks due to dissolution of Keiretu ties which has been
observed across all firms uniformly Xu and Wang (1999) Inoue (1999). The traditional buyer and supplier relationship has been disintegrating as a result of
technological advancement Andrews and Chompusri (2001) and rapid access to
quality suppliers has diminished the advantages of Keiretus Miwa and Ramseyer
(2005).
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Indicator for transfer of ultimate control to financial institutions
Indicator for transfer of ultimate control to nonfinancial institutions
Indicator for transfer of ultimate control to private
individuals or foreign corporations

FIT

Note:

PFIT

NFIT

definitions

Indicator for change in ultimate control

UCT

the

Indicator of ownership entity for government

GOVT

contains

Indicator of ownership entity for insiders

INSIDE

FRGN

table

Indicator of ownership entity for non-financial
firms
Indicator of ownership entity for domestic private
individuals
Indicator of ownership entity for foreign investors

NFISH

PRVT

Indicator of ownership entity for financial firms

FISH

the

empirical

Indicator for ownership concentration

DOWN

in

Proxy for firm size
Proxy for creditor control
Proxy for ownership concentration

Size
Quick Ratio
H-Index

used

Proxy for risk perception by the market investors
Proxy for restructuring activities

Z-score
GRE

variables

Proxy for restructuring activities

ECE

all

Proxy for firm’s performance

Tobin’s Q ratio

of

Annual growth in sale revenue; ∆Salest = (Salest −
Salest−1 )/Salest−1 ; as Salest indicates sales revenue in year
t.
Return on equity; ratio of earnings before interest and tax expenses
(EBIT) to total equity.
Efficiency in capital expenditures; ∆CEt = (CEt − CEt−1 )/CEt−1 ;
as CEt indicates capital expenditures in year t.
It is calculated on basis of standard formula by
Growth rate of employment; ∆Empt = (Empt − Empt−1 )/Empt−1 ;
as Empt indicates number of employees in year t.
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets
Ratio of book value of total
to book value of total assets
P debt
Herfindahl Index; HI =
Xj2 as Xi is the proportion of shares by
top 10 largest shareholders in a particular firm.
Dummy variable: 1 if a certain individual or institution has more
than 50% shares and 0 if none of the shareholders have more than
50% shares in a firm.
Financial institutions share ownership; percentage ratio of shareholding by financial institutions
Non-financial institutions share ownership; percentage ratio of shareholding by non-financial institutions
Private individuals share ownership; percentage ratio of shareholding
by domestic private individuals
Foreign institutions and individuals share ownership; percentage ratio
of shareholding by foreign institutions and individuals
Inside share ownership; percentage ratio of shareholding by insiders
such as directors and other employees
government share ownership; percentage ratio of shareholding by government and state owned agencies
Change in ultimate ownership; dummy variable: 1 if ultimate ownership changes in a particular firm and 0 if the firm does not experience
such a change.
Dummy variable; 1 if the ultimate transfer is to financial institutions
such as banks and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable; 1 if the ultimate transfer is to non-financial institutions such as other affiliate firms and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable; 1 if the ultimate transfer is to private individuals
or foreign corporations and 0 otherwise.

Proxy for firm’s performance

GRRP

This

Construction

Table 1: Definition of variables

Description

Variables
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Lincoln et al (1996) La Porta et al (1997) have supported the argument of
convergence hypothesis that these changes in the equity market have shifted the
corporate control market towards market-oriented investors and the Japanese
corporate governance system has increasingly evolved towards the North American ownership arrangements among keiretsu firms. These changes in equity
ownership have enhanced the importance of a fresh analysis of the corporate
control market.
In this research, we have segregated the whole corporate ownership structure into six classifications and concept of ultimate ownership will facilitate
the examination of the effect of performance on firm’s equity. These corporate
ownership identities are financial firms, non-financial firms, foreign institutional
investors, demotics private individuals, government and inside management including employees.
3.6 Change in ultimate ownership and control variables
The classification of ultimate owner or decisive owner and transfer of control has
been described in two steps for each company. Firstly, the criteria of percentage
shareholding is used to identify the ultimate owner of each sample company. If a
particular corporate ownership entity possesses 50 percent or more of the total
outstanding paid-up capital, it is considered as the ultimate owner of the firm.
Secondly, if none of the corporate ownership entity owns at least 50 percent of
outstanding shares, then the firm is identified as a diverse company.
After the identification of the ultimate owner the change in ultimate ownership and control transfer is analyzed on the basis of outstanding shares over the
same sample period of each ownership classification. If a particular identity was
possessing less than 50 percent of total outstanding shares in the previous year
but now owns 50 percent or more than this is documented as a control transfer
to the ultimate owner.
For the sake of hypothesis testing and to avoid the specification error in
the econometric model we have included six firm-specific financial indicators as
a control variable which have been extensively reported in previous literature.
These control variables might affect the firm’s value maximizing behavior as
well as its organizational structure. To control for variations and firm-specific
heterogeneity we included the firm size, Altman Z-Score, product market industrial share, tangibility and debt-equity ratio. The construction and composition
of each control variable is described in table 2.
4 Data and sample selection
Our sample consists of 25 years of longitudinal data from 1991 to 2015 of publicly listed companies from the Tokyo stock exchange which accounts for more
than 80% of Japanese financial market activities. The firms which belong to the
financial services industry like insurance companies, mutual funds are excluded
from the analysis due to their special capital structure. We have estimated a
balanced panel data of 1016 sample companies from the total population of 2440
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables
Variables

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev

Skew

Kurtosis

Firm size
Z-Score index
Market share
Tangibility
Debt-Equity ratio
Quick ratio
TOBIN’s Q ratio
Return on assets
Growth in sales
(GRRP)
Growth in employment (G.E)
Efficiency in capital exp.
Financial firms.
Non-Fin firms
Foreign investors
Private individuals
Insiders
Govt
CAT-1 (FIN)
CAT-2 (NFIN)
CAT-3 (PFIN)

4.25
3.49
0.37
157.65
170.7
127.1
1.5
6.35
5.99

4.35
3.43
0.17
137.903
130.107
103.35
0.81
5.31
3.74

6
94.48
3.99
399.9
599.9
499.7
10
78.89
99.98

0.01
-97.03
0
5.75
0.24
0.95
0.04
-79.6
-91.55

0.73
4.92
0.53
77.25
133.99
86.81
1.84
9.73
18.97

-1.44
-0.76
3.39
0.88
1.06
1.57
2.18
-0.05
1.03

6.87
133.503
17.96
3.29
3.37
5.74
7.74
18.88
8.37

-0.08

-0.02

2.9

-2.98

0.31

-2.48

22.36

214.94

124.8

1496

0.57

259.01

2.6

9.84

0.06
0.1
1.08
0.12
3.76
0.01
0
0.01
0.02

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.71
1
95.88
1
100
12.86
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.12
0.18
4.15
0.2
9.3
0.19
0.05
0.1
0.14

2.13
2.09
9.74
1.46
3.87
33.49
19.54
9.83
6.73

7.15
7.12
147.9
3.93
25.88
1489.28
382.085
97.62
46.31

listed companies in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Most of the variables are retrieved as they are presented in the financial
statements and very few of them are constructed. All information and data are
based on the consolidated book of accounts and financial statements to appraise
the firm’s financial performance and restructuring process throughout the sample period of the study. The values of each variable are taken at the end of the
fiscal year. Financial information has been retrieved from the Nikkei Economic
Electronic Databank system NEEDS hereafter; that is Handbook and World
scope of Japanese companies.
Furthermore, some variables like fixed assets, tangibility, sales growth had
extreme values. To deal with such problems 95% Winsorization transformation*
is applied to standardize the data. Winsorized estimators are generally efficient
in trimming the outlier and considered robust for regression analysis. Outliers
are replaced with average values of a firm so during that process we lost many
observations. It is worth mentioning that majority of the control variables and
the governance structure variable are based on the author’s own calculations.
The Z-score is based on the standard formula Altman Specification to predict
the bankruptcy or default risk of the firm.
A fixed effect model is estimated to evaluate the empirical evidence from
the financial records of a firm level dataset. The Fixed Effect Model is usually
applied to the panel dataset because first differencing of the model removes the
presence of heterogeneity.
Equation (1) contains the dependent variable yit for four measures of firm
performance and restructuring activities, two for each one. The α the is param48

Published by iRepository, December 2020

Business Review: (2017) 12(2):33-64

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol12/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1042

Ownership structure changes...

Fig1: Industrial distribution of sample firms listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange

eter to be estimated. The FISH is the ratio of financial institutions ownership,
NFISH is the ratio of other corporations’ ownership, PISH is the ratio of domestic private individual’s ownership and FISH is the share of foreign investors.
yit = α1 F ISHi,t−1 + α2 N F ISHi,t−1 + α3 P ISHi,t−1 + α4 F ISHi,t−1
+ α5 IN DSHi,t−1 + α6 GOV T SHi,t−1 + δ1 SIZEit + δ2 LEV ERAGEit
+ δ3 HIit + αi + εit

(1)

In the second stage of our analysis we estimated the same model, with the
inclusion of some additional binary variables. Equation 2 is representing the
second model for assessment of the time-lagged impact of ultimate ownership
on performance and restructuring activities.
yit = α1 F ISHi,t−1 + α2 N F ISHi,t−1 + α3 P ISHi,t−1 + α4 F ISHi,t−1
+ α5 IN DSHi,t−1 + α6 GOV T SHi,t−1 + β0 U CT(τ =0) + β1 U CTτ =1 + β2 U CTτ =2
+ δ1 SIZEit + δ2 LEV ERAGEit + δ3 HIit + αi + εit
(2)
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In the third stage, we further added two lead years of each ownership identity
in the same equation to capture the future impact of the change in ownership
on the firm’s value and restructuring activities. The specification of the model
is as follows:
yit = α1 F ISHi,t−1 + α2 N F ISHi,t−1 + α3 P ISHi,t−1 + α4 F ISHi,t−1
+ α5 IN DSHi,t−1 + α6 GOV T SHi,t−1 + β1 F IT(τ =0) + β2 F ITτ =1 + β3 F ITτ =2
+ β4 N F IT(τ =0) + β5 N F ITτ =1 + β6 N F ITτ =2 + β7 P F IT(τ =0) + β8 P F ITτ =1
+ β9 P F ITτ =2 + δ1 SIZEit + δ2 LEV ERAGEit + δ3 HIit + αi + εit
(3)
Initially, we employed the Hausman (1978) specification to establish the relationship between the explanatory variables and firm-specific effect. The Hausman test is usually used as a benchmark method to assess the appropriateness
of estimated parameters with fixed effects or random effects formulation.
Table 6 presents the computed chi-square values which imply that the firmspecific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables. The random effects
estimates are not appropriate because of the high probability of a correlation
that can produce significant biases in estimates. Hence, fixed effects models seem
more suitable for the estimation of equation (1) to (3) to assess the nature and
direction of a relationship between the ownership structure and firm’s value and
restructuring activities.
Finally, we estimate the fixed effects model specification for the above three
equations for all the dependent variables. The results of multivariate models
(FEM) to evaluate the relationship between the dependent variables and explanatory variables for the impact of ownership structure and control variables
are presented in table 5 & 6.
Table 3: Summary of key ultimate ownership transfers
Variables

Description

(UCT=1)
(UCT=0)
N
FIT
NFIT
PFIT

Firms experience change in control
Firms that do not experience change in control
Total firms included in sample
Transfer of ultimate control to financial institutions
Transfer of ultimate control to non-financial institutions
Transfer of ultimate control to private individuals or foreign corporations

Firms
847
169
1016
66
255
526

Note: FIT, NFIT and PFIT are variables indicating the transfer of ownership to
financial institutions, non-financial corporations and private individuals respectively.

5 Multivariate and univariate results
This section presents empirical outcomes of the subsequent transfer of corporate
control and change in ultimate ownership on performance and on the extent
of organizational restructuring. Section 5.1 presents the univariate descriptive
analysis and section 5.2 reports the results of the multivariate model.
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5.1 Univariate empirical results
In the univariate analysis, we examine whether companies that experience a
change in decisive ownership in any sample year perform better than firms that
do not experience such change. For the firm with control transfer to various
ownership identities, the measure of central tendencies (mean and median) of the
various measures of firm values and organizational restructuring are calculated
for the year prior to control transfer (year -1), for the year of the change in
control (year 0) and in the following two years (year 1 and year 2) for the
sake of compression of the average performance in various years. For the firms,
without control transfer, the calculated figures are for the entire sample years.
The results for two different measures of firms’ performance are provided
in table 4. The empirical results suggest that the growth in sale revenue rises
from 8.023% to 7.71% in the year of change in control. In the two post change
years, it rises significantly to 7.625% in the first year and to 7.71% in the second
year. In the year prior to change, the sales growth is lower than 8.023% for the
firm without the change in control, however, in the year of change and in the
following two years, it is higher than the growth of sales revenue of firms in
which ownership does not change.
Similarly, the Tobin’s Q ratio increases by 11.192% in the year of change in
control which is significantly higher than 7.192% in the year prior to the change.
Prior to the change in ownership, the average market performance indicated by
Tobin’s Q ratio of firms with a change in control is approximately 9.322% higher
than 7.192% for firms that do not experience a change in ownership. However,
it is significantly lower than the 13.111% in the year of change and 15.041% in
the following two years for the firm without the change in control.
Overall the results of univariate analysis reveal that the performance in the
year prior to the change for firms with the change in control is higher than
the average performance of firms without a change in ownership for both the
measures of performance. The results are consistent with our earlier expectations
and lead to the acceptance of our first hypothesis. The results suggest that new
ultimate owners are opting for their disciplinary role in the firms which results
in improvement in profitability and average performance.
In order to evaluate the impact of the change in control on the extent of
organizational restructuring activities, the univariate results are presented in
table 4. Capital expenditures have increased significantly in the year of change
and in two subsequent years after the change in control. The growth in capital
expenditures increased from 23.794% in the year prior to the change, to 26.307%
in the year of change, among the firms that experience change in ownership. The
growth in capital expenditure in the year prior to the change is higher than that
of the firms without a change in control but is significantly lower than 26.309%
in the year of change and in the following two years.
Furthermore, firms with a change in control experience significant expansion
in the book value of fixed assets following change in control. The fixed assets
growth rate increased from 4.841% a year prior to change to 4.160% in the year
of change within the group of firms with a change in ownership, but in the
subsequent two years it falls again to 2.914%. The growth rate, in the year of
Business Review: (2017) 12(2):33-64

Published by iRepository, December 2020

51

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol12/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1042

S. Iqbal, K. Mustafa
change in control, is almost same at 4.253% for the firms that do not experience
such a change. The results show that, while fixed assets increase following a
change in control, this increase is still lower than the average growth rate of
fixed assets for firms that do not experience a change in ownership.
Overall the results of the univariate analysis reveal that new ultimate owners
enforce their control strongly and major restructuring activities take place to
alter and reshape the organizational assets and structure in order to pursue
their ultimate objectives.
Table 4: Univariate results of the impact of change in corporate control
Variables

Period

No chg in control

Obsv

Chg in control

Obsv

8.023
6.775
7.625
7.71

9075
737
847
785

7.322
14.1923
15.111
16.041

9075
737
847
785

16.516
23.423
24.794
26.309

9075
737
847
785

4.84
4.253
4.16
4.114

9075
737
847
785

-1.07
-1.869
-1.067
-1.063

9075
737
847
785

Growth in revenue
Year
Year
Year
Year

(-1)
(0)
(1)
(2)

Year
Year
Year
Year

(-1)
(0)
(1)
(2)

Year
Year
Year
Year

(-1)
(0)
(1)
(2)

Year
Year
Year
Year

(-1)
(0)
(1)
(2)

Year
Year
Year
Year

(-1)
(0)
(1)
(2)

7.545

653

10.192

653

18.751

653

4.16

653

-1.069

653

Tobin’s Q ratio

Growth in capex

Growth in F. assets

Growth in emp

5.2 Multivariate empirical results
Examining the effect of ultimate ownership conveys very important information.
The signs and statistical significance of the regression coefficients are stable for
the various measures of firms’ performance and restructuring activities but,
there are marked differences in the magnitude of the impact of the explanatory
variables on the performance and restructuring measures. In order to test the
hypotheses, we broadly focus on the relationships between firm performance
and ownership structure.
The empirical results of multivariate models put forward two important
messages regarding the impact of ultimate ownership and control transfer on
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firm’s value and restructuring activities. First, the sign and statistical significance are consistent with univariate results for the four dependent variables.
But the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in multivariate models exhibits
marked differences. Second, the significance of multivariate results is based on
regression analysis and effectiveness of robust techniques. Our primary focus is
to assess the impact of ownership structure and control transfer on the firm’s
value and restructuring activities.
Table 5: Empirical findings of ownership structure, corporate performance and restructuring
activities
Firm performance
Dependent Variable
Firm size
Z-score
Product market share
Tangibility
Leverage
Quick ratios
Non Fin
Govt
Inside
Prvt
FIN
Forn
J-stat (P-value)
Lag: 2 Serial Corr. (Pvalue)

Tobin’s Q
0.827*
(0.003)
-0.003*
0
-0.095*
0
-0.001*
0
-0.001*
0
-0.004*
0
33.413*
(0.055)
-0.054*
(0.019)
0.033
(0.022)
-0.008
(0.017)
0.009*
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.395
0.082

Restructuring activities

ROAP

GRE

-13.840*
(0.215)
0.040*
(0.006)
-3.920*
(0.014)
-0.060**
(0.001)
-0.120*
0
-0.200*
(0.001)
1558.45*
(5.086)
-0.26
(0.261)
0.2
(0.295)
-0.18
(0.236)
0.01
(0.061)
0.01
(0.01)
0.318
0.024

0.0876
(0.136)
0.001*
0
0
(0.393)
0.0229
(0.018)
0.001
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.716*
(0.062)
-1.832
(140.873)
3.7*
(0.575)
164.4
(528.754)
-648.3*
(73.403)
0.063
(0.035)
0.538
0.004

ECE
537.229*
(1.593)
0.009
(0.097)
191.35*
(0.405)
3.348*
(0.012)
5.804*
(0.013)
9.126*
(0.02)
-73504.2*
(154.248)
-563.35
(250.52)
15.645
(20.66)
-10.745
(13.58)
6.145
(8.31)
4.145
(10.71)
0.138
0.038

Note: This table reports the finding of the Fixed Effect Model regression estimates of the
left-hand side variables growth in sale revenue (GRRP), TOBINS-Q (TOBIN), growth in
capital expenditures (GCE), and growth rate in employment (GRE). Standard errors are in
parenthesis. *, ** and ***indicate that individual coefficients are statistically significant at
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance respectively. The number of observations is 24500.

5.3 Ownership structure and firm value
The results in table 6 show the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and restructuring activities. First, we observe that leverage has a statistically significant effect on corporate performance. According to table 6, empirical
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results of the multivariate model suggest that a strong relationship exists between the various measures of firm’s performance and corporate restructuring
in the short and medium run. The impact of ownership structure and ultimate
ownership initially have an unclear impact on performance and restructuring
but gradually improve the firm’s value and support the hypothesis regarding
the restructuring process in the sample firm.
The estimated parameters of multivariate regression support the theoretical
view regarding the disciplinary role of newly placed ownership Jensen (1986).
Moreover, the dummy is negatively related to dependent variables of firm value
while positively related to organizational restructuring.
The ownership identities have an impact on firm’s value as well as on the
restructuring activities due to strong intervention in decision making and operational function by the newly replaced ownership of companies. The impact on
the shareholding ratio is statistically significant for both financial and nonfinancial firms. This particularly holds for the ownership identities of nonfinancial firms that have a more powerful influence on the management and
is able to insulate them from outside involvements.
Multivariate results also indicate that high stabilized ownership can isolate
management from outside pressures. Furthermore, the impact of shareholding
on restructuring activities is not clear for both financial and non-financial institutions. Financial sector ownership has a negative influence on the progressive
rate of employment and no statistical substantial effect on the efficiency of capital expenditures, while shareholding by other affiliated firms has statistically
significant effect on expansion in terms of growth in employment.
The market-oriented ownership identities have a significantly negative influence on both measures of firm value and are positively related to the extent
of growth in capital expenditures. However, the growth in employment is unaffected by shareholding by domestic individuals or foreign institutions. This
suggests that foreign and private ownership identities have a strong influence
on management related decision-making practices in Japanese firms and the
role of market investors is consistently associated with high performance and
an increase in efficiency.
Inside ownership as characterized by managers and employees has a positive
effect on firm value and on restructuring activities in the firm except for growth
in capital expenditures. Furthermore, government shareholding does not have
a negative impact on performance measures, proxies of restructuring activities,
growth in employment and capital expenditures. The control variables are consistent with the theoretical relationship of performance indicators and proxies
of restructuring activities.
The Z-score has a significant negative effect on firm’s market value indicator
Tobin’s Ratio, but positive and statistically significant effect on ROAP due to
risk free expectation of profit by investors. It shows positive and statically significant relationship with growth in employment and insignificant but positive
relationship with efficiency of capital expenditure. The impact of tangibility and
Quick Ratio observed on both performance indicators are negative and statistically significant, but the quick ratio has a negative and insignificant effect on
growth rate of employment and a positive and significant effect on efficiency of
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capital expenditure.
The Product Market Industrial share (INDS) is an indicator of competition
which is also added to the control variables to assess the firm’s competitiveness in its particular industrial sector. The sign and magnitude of the industrial
share confirms the adverse impact of competition on firm’s performance. The
constructed variable INDS has a negative and significant impact on both performance measures, Tobin’s Q Ratio and Return on Assets and its impact on
restructuring activities is not worth standing.

5.4 Corporate restructuring, firm value and ultimate change in ownership
Equation (2) is regressed to evaluate the influence of a change in ultimate control, and the results of FEM are presented in table 6. The impact of control
variables and governance structure is similar to the outcomes of table 5 in terms
of statistical significance and sign, though there is trivial variation in degrees
(results not reported in table 6). The estimates of the model regarding control
transfer also confirm our former expectations. The coefficient of the first and
second period after the control transfer is affirmative and substantial for both
measures of firm value and restructuring activities.
The results regarding the ROAP indicate that the return on assets improves
in the first and second year after the change in control as the estimated effect is
positive and highly statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of U CTτ =0
(the year of change in control) is positive with 10% level of significance.
Regarding the market measures of corporate performance, the results reveal
that Tobin’s Q ratio increases at all the points in time since the event occurs.
The impact on ROAP is almost same in the first two periods. The impact of the
Table 6: Impact of control transfer on firms’ value and restructuring activities
Firm performance

Restructuring activities

Dependent Variable

Tobin’s Q

ROAP

ECE

GRE

U CTτ =0

0.309*
(0.112)
0.094*
(0.07)
0.198*
(0.06)
0.404
0.379
15.404
16.006
0

0.071*
(0.021)
0.016*
(0.006)
0.002*
(0.003)
0.942
0.939
0.553
382.18
0

8.318
(5.962)
-3.474
(3.124)
0.87
(2.079)
0.988
0.9875
97.4841
1943.659
0

0.025
(0.009)
0.004*
(0.004)
0.008
(0.002)
0.196
0.161
0.279
5.734
0

U CTτ =1
U CTτ =2
R2
Adj-R2
S.E.of regression
F-statistic
F-stat(P-value)

Note: The table reports results of the fixed effects two stages least square (FE-2SLS) model
of the dependent variables return on assets (ROAP) and Tobin’s Q ratio (TQR). The detailed definition of the estimated model is given in equation (3) and (6). Both the estimations include time control (not reported). The LM serial corr. test (P-value) is the probability value of the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test of order 2. The Null hypothesis
is that the second order residuals correlation is zero. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance respectively.
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change in ultimate ownership on the extent of restructuring activities at various
points of time show that the efficiency of capital expenditure rises in the year
of change in control and in the second year after the change, however, the estimated effect is greater in the first fiscal year. This suggests that restructuring
activities are taken into account by the new ownership for enrichment of their
own strategic objectives.
Regarding restructuring activities measured in terms of growth rate in employment in the firm, there is significant difference in growth rate of employment
in firms which experience a change in control and those that do not experience
such a change. However the employment level declines with the passage of time
after the year of change in ultimate ownership.
The results propose that the firm value, either specified as book value or
market value, improves in two years after the change in ultimate ownership.
Control transfer is followed by restructuring activities in terms of rise in efficiency in capital expenditure, contraction in growth of fixed assets and gradual
fall in employment level.

5.5 Transfer of control to various corporate entities and firm performance
To market valuation amongst the transfer to different corporate entities, equation 3 is estimated, which accounts for the information regarding the transferred
parties, by employing the FEM. The estimated equation includes all the control
and governance structure variables along with the ownership transfer to various
corporate entities considered as dummy variables. Table 7 presents the results
for the impact of the ownership change to various entities observed at three
distinct periods.
The impact of debt and equity and ownership explanatory variables are analogous to the results presented in table 6 in terms of statistical significance and
sign, except for some minor variation in the scales of the said variables. The results disclose the impact of change in ownership on performance measures and
restructuring activities among various ownership identities.
Tobin’s ratios improve in the first and second year after the change in control
and are statistically significant for FIT transfers. The impact of financial institution transfers in the year of control transfer can be seen by the negative sign
and the magnitude of financial institution control transfers (FIT). Tobin’s Q
falls in the year prior to control transfer for non-financial institutions (NFIT)
and improves in the year of control transfer which is highly statistically significant. After that it consistently falls for both years after the change in control.
There is a statistically significant impact of private-financial institution transfers in the year of control transfer and in the prior year, but the relationship
is negative in all the four years. This is consistent with corporate governance
literature as market oriented shareholders are not interested in long-term corporate policy and planning.
Sales growth improves only in the first year after the control transfer but is
statistically insignificant in the current year and year after PFIT transfers. The
impact of control transfer on ROAP, rises in the next two years after the con56
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Table 7: Results of various corporate entities and control transfers
Conditional fixed effects estimates
Dependent Variable
F ITτ =−1
F ITτ =0
F ITτ =1
F ITτ =2
N F ITτ =−1
N F ITτ =0
N F ITτ =1
N F ITτ =2
P F ITτ =−1
P F ITτ =0
P F ITτ =1
P F ITτ =2
R2
Adj-R2
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
F-stat (P-value)

Firm performance

Restructuring activities

Tobin’s Q

ROAP

ECE

0.069**
(0.039)
-0.144*
(0.04)
0.097*
(0.0420
0.034
(0.045)
-0.112
(0.021)
0.016*
(0.022)
-0.021
(0.023)
-0.021
(0.022)
-0.051*
(0.016)
-0.27***
(0.017)
-0.001
(0.017)
-0.009
(0.015)
0.97
0.97
3864.18
0
0.97

-0.021*
(0.535)
0.328**
(0.552)
0.461*
(0.58)
0.282*
(0.614)
0.182
(0.294)
0.688
(0.31)
0.503*
(0.32)
0.325
(0.309)
0.046
(0.218)
-0.740*
(0.228)
-0.272
(0.228)
-0.485*
(0.208)
0.791
0.791
2824.19
0
0.791

3.245
(8.597)
-4.045
(8.873)
3.945
(9.326)
7.744
(9.874)
7.345***
(4.724)
10.445*
(4.98)
-10.945*
(5.149)
11.244*
(4.972)
-2.245
(3.499)
-3.145
(3.673)
-6.550*
(3.663)
5.510*
(3.347)
0.33
0.329
367.019
0
0.33

GRE
-0.015
(0.031)
-0.002
(0.028)
-0.016
(0.033)
0.081*
(0.016)
0.012
(0.017)
-0.035*
(0.015)
0.01
(0.016)
0.030***
(0.012)
0.014
(0.012)
0.015*
(0.012)
0.025
(0.011)
0.024*
(0.017)
0.25
0.236
257.261
0
0.25

Note: The table reports results of the fixed effects model of the dependent variables return on assets (ROAP), Tobin’s Q ratio (TQR), Growth in capital expenditure (ECE)and Growth in employment(GRE) . The detailed definition of the estimated model is given in equation (3) and (5). Both the estimations include time control (not reported). The LM serial corr. test (P-value) is the probability value of the
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test of order 2. The Null hypothesis is that the second order residuals correlation is zero. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficients
are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance respectively.

trol transfer and is highly statistically significant at 1% in case of FIT transfers,
but it falls before control transfer to financial institutions. This indicates that
the role of financial institutions and the main bank impacts firm performance
indirectly.
For the NFIT transfers, the return on stocks improve in all the four years but
are statistically significant in the first two years after the control transfer. The
results for non-financial institutional transfers are mixed. The impact on stock
returns is positive in the first and second period after the transfer of ownership
to non-financial institutions but is not clear in the year of ownership transfer.
The results of PFIT indicate that in case of ROAP, the performance of the
firm is constantly declining in the year of control transfer to private and foreign
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shareholders. This almost confirms the adverse impact on performance as indicated by Tobin’s Q ratio.
The results of change in ultimate ownership of the impact of changeovers in
different corporate entities, compared with firms that do not experience such
a change in control show that efficiency of capital expenditures rises in the
following two years after the change in control for financial institutions and
non-financial institutions control transfers, except for the year of control transfer. The sign and magnitude of FIT and NFIT in the year of control is negative
and statistically significant. We discover a progressive relationship between restructuring activities and ownership transfer to any of the three ownership entities particularly when restructuring activities are measured in terms of capital
expenditures. However, the estimated impact is higher in magnitude and significance for the FIT and NFIT transfers than the transfers to private individuals.
The results are stable and subsequently resemble the free-cash-flow theory of
Shleifer and Vishny (1991).
Both financial and non-financial institutions can be promoted in different
ways through huge capital expenditures made by their allied business identities.
The rise in capital expenditures in firms that experience transfer to financial
and non-financial institutions can promote other marketable and non-equity ties
within the firm. The affiliated institutions may benefit from these expenditures
on either the buying or the supplying side of a trade relationship Charkham
(1994). The employment level is affected by all the three transfers at these
three points in time. We find a negative relationship between restructuring activities and ownership transfer to FIT prior to and in the first year after control
transfer but a positive and statistically significant relationship in the second
year.
The estimated relationship between growth in labor force and non-financial
institutions is observed positive and insignificant except in the year of control
transfer. In the year of control transfer, it is negative and statistically significant. This implies that internal downsizing and right-sizing of the workforce is
adversely associated with transfer of control to non-financial institutions. The
direction of the relationship with growth in labor remains positive but is statistically significant in the year of control transfer and in the second year in case
of PFIT. This suggests that conversion from labor intensive to capital intensive
technology is a long-term activity and needs sufficient lag interval to be considered.
The results presented in table 7 describe the provocative fact that there is
a direct relationship between domestic private investors and change in ultimate
ownership but the relationship is negative with weak statistical significance for
financial and Keiretus firms. The results also confirm the negative relation between the control transfers to financial institutions and non-financial business
identity (Keiretus).
Corporate ownership can thus insulate managers from external pressure and
promote business value and efficiency. Furthermore, it suggests developing longterm ties rather than monitoring the role of the corporate identities. Interestingly in case of firm efficiency and value, results suggest that coefficients of PFIT
are negative and statistically significant. Non-financial firms have a negative re-
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lationship between restructuring and firm’s performance indicators.
The sales growth improves only in the first year after the change in control
but is statistically insignificant in the current and second period for the PFIT
transfers. For financial institution transfers the sales revenue falls in all three
periods but the fall in the second year after the change is much larger than the
preceding two years. There is no statistically significant impact of non-financial
institution transfers in all the three periods.
The ROAP, rises only for the year of change in case of PFIT transfers but is
unaffected in the subsequent two periods for the private transfers. For the FIT
transfers, the return on stocks improve in the first period but fall in the subsequent two periods after the change in ultimate ownership. Results regarding the
non-financial institutional transfers are mixed. The impact on stock returns is
negative in the first period and positive in the second period after the transfer
of ownership to non-financial institutions but is unaffected in the year of ownership transfer.
The results of control transfer in various corporate entities on restructuring
activities compared with firms that do not experience such a change in control
show that efficiency on capital expenditures rises in the following two years after
the change in control for all the three transfers except for the year of transfer to
private individuals, where it is negative and statistically significant. The impact
on growth rate in fixed assets is positive in the years after the change in ownership for FIT and NFIT and the firms experience contraction in fixed assets
growth for the PFIT. Regarding the employment level, it is unaffected by all
the three transfers at all the three points in time. This suggests that conversion
from labor intensive to capital intensive technology is a long-term activity and
needs sufficient lag interval to be considered.

6 Summary and Conclusion
Corporate reforms in Japan has significantly influenced both the performance
and organizational restructuring of listed companies. There are sufficient evidences and findings which support the argument regarding sensitivity of firms
towards reforms because of the market oriented corporate governance mechanism. The financial deregulation and corporate reforms have resolved the agency
problem and promoted equity markets which has profoundly weakened the bankcentered system.
Our empirical findings presents a fresh analysis regarding the impact of governance on firm’s performance and restructuring activities. Ownership structure
and control transfer are positively associated with firm value and organizational
restructuring on the listed companies of TSE. Our panel data estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that both the restructuring process and firm value
are profoundly associated with reforms and the corporate governance system.
Our results have key significance as they can guide policy makers after the
controversial completion of Abenomics policies in Japan. There are many inferences that can be used as a source of direction. First, the market oriented
shareholders still hold lesser proportions of equity then stable shareholders but
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their equity positions have been increasing after the introduction of market oriented governance system. This indicates that the collective impact of ownership
transfer to private individuals and foreign institutional shareholders will improve firms’ efficiency and the payoffs for minority shareholders.
Secondly, the introduction of independent directors and the new law of information disclosure has reduced agency costs and has positive effects on firm
value and restructuring activities. Furthermore, control transfer to the government does not have any impact on firm performance and value. The results also
provide vibrant indications that the change in control is followed by improvement in efficiency and performance.
Lastly, we find that there is an indirect relationship between firm’s performance and control transfer to financial institutional shareholders which suggests
that unwinding the cross-shareholding between banks and corporations causes
efficiency loss. But financial firms still have significant equity position in listed
companies. Moreover, control transfer to Keiretus based shareholdings have a
significant negative impact on restructuring activities and firm performance.
This means that group oriented benefits can only be ripe in times of high performance otherwise profit making firms will prefer to unwind their cross-holdings.
Thus, Japanese corporations are building business relationships with high performance firms and looking towards business diversification, both in the product
and capital market.
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Appendix

Table A1: Data set
No

Name of Industrial Sector

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Air transportation
Chemicals
Construction
Electric appliances
Electric power & gas
Fishery, agriculture & forestry
Foods
Glass & ceramics products
Information & communication
Iron & steel
Land transportation
Machinery
Marine transportation
Metal products
Nonferrous metals
Oil & coal products
Other financing business
Other products
Pharmaceutical
Precision instruments
Pulp & paper
Real estate
Retail trade
Rubber products
Securities & commodity futures
Services
Textile & apparel
Transport equipment
Warehousing and harbor transportation
Wholesale trade
Total
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No of companies
2
73
78
58
6
2
44
20
73
16
8
86
3
34
9
4
3
35
21
10
6
22
134
5
3
94
16
37
15
99
1016

63

64
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0.408
0.095
0.005
0.128
0.001
0
0.001
0.133
0.081
0.003
0.098
0.177
0.008

11.288*
1.713*
-0.095*
3.177*
-0.003*
0.001*
0.003*
0.498*
-0.085*
0.063*
1.181*
-3.441*
0.066*
0.641
0.626
6.463
42.493
0

S-Error

ROAP
Coefficient

0.942
0.937
0.558
373.121
0

-0.443*
0.328*
-0.004*
1.290*
-0.001*
0.000*
0.001*
0.001*
-0.025*
0.004*
0.073*
-0.844*
0.003*

Coefficient

TOBIN

0.023
0.005
0
0.019
0
0
0
0.01
0.01
0
0.007
0.021
0

S-Error

0.19
0.156
0.281
5.597
0

-0.164*
0.032*
0.001*
-0.088*
0.001*
0.000*
0.000*
0.021*
0.001*
0.001*
-0.047*
-0.093*
0.001*

Coefficient

GE

0.011
0.003
0
0.005
0
0
0
0.007
0.005
0
0.005
0.012
0

S-Error

0.19
0.156
0.281
5.597
0

229.093*
-7.105*
0.153*
13.768*
0.025*
0.011*
0.013*
15.383*
-11.911**
-7.767*
0.668*
0.428*
-0.004*

Coefficient

ECE

2.173
0.515
0.028
0.784
0.004
0.001
0.003
3.468
4.935
1.279
0.175
0.028
0.0001

S-Error

Note: The table reports results of the fixed effects two stages least square (FE-2SLS) model of the dependent variables. The detailed definition of the estimated model is given in equation (01) and (03). The Null hypothesis is that the second order residuals correlation is
zero. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance respectively.

Constant
Size(FS)
Z-Score
INDS
TANG
DER
Q-RATIO
NFIS
GOVT
INSIDERS
PRVT
FIS
FORN
Diagnostic Tests
R2
Adj-R2
S.E.of Reg.
F-statistic
F-stat (P-value)

Dependent Variable

Table A2: Fixed Effect-2SLS
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